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Abstract 
The Ultimatum Game is a famous sequential, two-player game intensely studied in Game 
Theory. A proposer can offer a certain fraction of some amount of a valuable good, for 
example, money. A responder can either accept, in which case the money is shared 
accordingly, or reject the offer, in which case the two players receive nothing. While most 
authors suggest that the fairest split of 50% vs. 50% would be the equilibrium solution, 
recently R. Suleiman (An aspirations-homeostasis theory of interactive decisions (2014) 
http://vixra.org/abs/1403.0029) suggested the Golden Ratio, 0.618…, to be the solution and 
argued that such a partitioning would be considered fair by both sides. He provided a 
justification in terms of an approach termed aspirations-homeostasis theory. The main idea is 
that responders tend to accept the minor fraction of the Golden Ratio because they feel that 
this fraction equals, in comparison to the larger fraction obtained by the proposer, the ratio of 
the larger fraction and the whole amount. Here we give an alternative explanation to that 
suggested solution, which complements the reasoning by Suleiman (2014) and is based on 
infinite continued fractions. 
 
Introduction 
The Ultimatum Game is a famous asymmetric, two-player game intensely studied in Game 
Theory. It had been devised by Güth et al. (1982). The idea is the following: One player, 
called the “proposer”, is handed a valuable good, say 100 €. She is to offer any part of it to the 
second player, called the “responder”. We here use the feminine forms (she, her etc.) 
throughout, meaning to cover both genders. The responder can choose between two strategies: 
to accept or to reject.  If she accepts, the money is shared accordingly. If she rejects, neither of 
the players receives anything. It is a sequential game because one player makes her move first 
and the other one only thereafter. There are several modified versions such as the δ-
Ultimatum Game (Suleiman, 1996) and a spatial variant (cf. Iranzo et al., 2011). 
In the standard Ultimatum Game, there is a case that at very low total amounts, say 10 cents, 
any non-zero offer would be accepted because the amount is so tiny. Also at very large total 
amounts, say 10 million €, low fractional offers, say 10 % might be accepted because the 
responder might not dare to decline 1 million €. However, experimental observations show 
that the outcome changes only insignificantly if stakes are raised (cf. Camerer and Thaler, 
1995). Thus, in what follows, we assume that the total amount does not really matter and we 
argue in terms of percentages. 
We denote the fraction the proposer wants to keep by x. Then the offer is 1−x. If we assume 
that the smallest unit of the used currency is such that the smallest non-zero offer is 1%, then 
x = 99%, 1−x = 1% is the Nash equilibrium, the so-called rational solution (cf. Page and 
Nowak, 2000, 2002). This is because the responder does not have an incentive to decline that 
offer, as it is still larger than 0. The proposer would not deviate either from that strategy 
because it grants her the largest amount. However, the manifold experiments with that game 
in diverse ethnical communities show that such a low offer is usually rejected. Roth et al. 
(1991) run the Ultimatum Game in four different cities: Jerusalem, Ljubljana (Slovenia), 
Tokyo and Pittsburgh. The results were strikingly similar. In all four locations, the modal 
offers were in the range of 0.4−0.5 and were usually accepted by the responders. Henrich et al. 
(2005) conducted a very comprehensive study with 17 different ethnic groups all over the 
world. The average offers ranged from 0.26-0.57 with a pronounced peak in the range 0.4-
0.45 (9 ethnic groups). 
Offers below 0.3 (cf. Nowak et al., 2000) or below 0.2 are usually rejected (Page and Nowak, 
2002; Suleiman et al., 2014). A clear-cut threshold is hard to determine because there is 
actually a continuous frequency distribution of rejection as a function of x.  
The Ultimatum Game was also played with chimpanzees, using raisins as the good to be 
shared (Jensen et al., 2007; Proctor et al., 2013). It turned out that the Nash equilibrium 
(rational solution) describes their behaviour quite well, that is, responders were satisfied with 
low offers (for a critical discussion, see Henrich and Silk, 2013).  
Although the Ultimatum Game is a one-shot game, most people assume that it will be iterated 
(cf. Nowak et al., 2000). An alternative reasoning leading to the same conclusion is that 
people have learned rules of behaviour from iterated games that they apply also to one-shot 
games (Camerer and Thaler, 1995). This may explain why very low offers are rejected. 
Responders tend to “punish” proposers who make low offers, hoping that they will make 
larger offers in the next round. Note that the proposer in the next round need not be the same 
person. Since, usually, people in a population can communicate, all people know that 
selfishness would be punished and would imply a low reputation (cf. Nowak et al., 2000).  
Some authors distinguish between two parameters: p as the average offer (denoted here by 
1−x) and q as the minimum offer responders will accept. Computer simulations by Page and 
Nowak (2000) show that q tends towards p in evolutionary dynamics. This is intuitively 
understandable because if q < p, proposers would decrease p. Accordingly, we need only one 
parameter to describe the solution, at least approximately. A quantitatively more precise 
approach would be to derive frequency distributions describing the acceptance/rejection 
behaviour of the proposer and responder, respectively.     
Game Theory has become a large and powerful theoretical framework. Entities ranging from 
nations, companies (cf. Gintis, 2000), staff headquarters, people (cf. Güth et al., 1982; Page 
and Nowak, 2000, 2002), animals (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), 
plants (King, 1990) and living cells (Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer, 2004) down to molecules (cf. 
Bohl et al., 2014) are considered as players. The tools used in that theory are quite diverse as 
well. Not only the classical Nash equilibrium determined in payoff matrices is used, but also 
differential equations (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Gintis, 2000), the concept of 
evolutionary stable strategies (Maynard Smith, 1982; King, 1990) and others.   
Recently, Suleiman (2014) suggested that the Golden Ratio (GR) would be a plausible 
solution of the Ultimatum Game. This is intuitively appealing because the Golden Ratio, 
0.618…, is one of the few numbers between 0.5 and 1 that can be explained in a minimalist, 
natural way. One out of several definitions for that number is the equation (1−x)/x = x. It says 
that the ratio between the smaller and larger fractions is the same as the ratio between the 
larger fraction and the whole. This leads to the solution 
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As 5  is an irrational number, so is the GR. The GR is used frequently in architecture, 
painting and photography and occurs in phyllotaxis (leaf positions on plants) (Jean, 1994).   
Another definition is based on the Fibonacci numbers. These numbers are defined by the 
recursive equation  
 
 11 −+ += nnn fff          (2) 
 and the initial conditions   
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This leads to the series 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, … It can easily be shown that the ratio of two 
consecutive Fibonacci numbers tends to the  GR (cf. Koshy, 2001): 
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The main idea of Suleiman (2014) in his justification for the proposed solution is based on 
definition (1). Responders tend to accept an offer of the minor fraction of the GR, 1−x*, 
because they feel that this fraction corresponds, in comparison to the larger fraction obtained 
by the proposer, to the ratio of the larger fraction and the whole amount; the latter is the 
maximum amount the proposed could get in principle. This equality of fractions may be felt 
by both players as a fair division. In an evolutionary context, this might be related to the 
observation that relative fitness (that is, in comparison to competitors) is more important than 
absolute fitness.  
Earlier authors (e.g. Nowak et al., 2000; Page and Nowak, 2001, 2002), in contrast, call the 
50 % : 50 % solution the fair split. To distinguish the two, we will call the 50 % : 50 % 
solution “equipartition”. 
Here, we will give another explanation for the above-mentioned hypothesis that the GR would 
be the equilibrium solution of the Ultimatum Game. It is based on continued fractions, a tool 
used in several areas in mathematics (Olds et al., 1992; Cuyt et al., 2008).  
 
Explanation in terms of continued fractions 
When a proposer can make an offer to the responder, she will certainly think about two 
possible options: 
(i) How would the responder react if I offered x1 = 1? Answer: She would certainly decline. 
(ii) How would the responder react if I offered x2 = 0.5? Answer: She would certainly accept 
because this is the fairest division. 
These two thought experiments need not be performed in the given order. This does not, 
however, affect our line of reasoning. 
The offers mentioned in (i) and (ii) can be written as  
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respectively.  
Although the division of money mentioned in (ii) is the fairest deal at first sight, there is a 
case for assuming that it is not the stable solution. Consider a population of responders and 
assume first that all of them would decline any offer below 0.5. This would force proposers to 
stay with equipartition. However, a subpopulation of responders could start accepting offers 
lower than 0.5. This strategy would grant them an advantage, at least short-term. Under the 
plausible assumption that there are always some fluctuations in the offers (cf. Nowak et al., 
2000), proposers will notice that there are some responders accepting offers lower than 0.5, 
and therefore, will make them. As those responders who decline such offers will not get 
anything, the modest responders will have an advantage. As they undermine the punishing 
strategy, they can, in a sense, be considered as cheaters. However, we should be careful with 
such moral notions, all the more as we could, paradoxically, call these responders both modest 
(or frugal) and selfish. Finally, all responders must act in this way because the cooperative 
responders (accepting only offers 5.0≥x ) are outcompeted. Thus, the evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS, Maynard Smith, 1982) is certainly to accept offers lower than 0.5. 
This situation is reminiscent of the arms race in the growth of trees in a forest. It would be 
best for all trees in a forest to reach exactly the height optimal for biomass production. 
However, this is not an ESS. It can be invaded by trees that are taller because they get more 
sunlight. The evolutionarily stable height is somewhat larger than the optimum height (King, 
1990). 
The question arises down to what minimum value offers can decrease so that they are still 
accepted by the modest responders. A straightforward question proposers will ask themselves 
is: 
(iii) How would the responder react if I offered him half of what I get? That is, x3 = 2/3.  
The rationale for (iii) is that the ratio (1−x)/x = ½ would be that positive ratio less than unity 
that involves the smallest integers possible. 
The answer by the responder is more difficult to predict. There is a case for her declining 
because she may be disappointed to get only half of what the proposer gets. Empirical 
observations show that some responders accept but many decline. Anyway, the fraction x can, 
in this case, be written as 
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Inspecting the formulas (5a,b) and (6) and extending the reasoning in a straightforward way, 
one may conclude that the equilibrium solution is given by the infinite continued fraction 
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This result can be substantiated in a more detailed way as follows. The proposer could ask 
herself whether a small deviation from x2 = 0.5 would be acceptable by the responder, say x = 
0.51. It probably would because the offer is very near to 0.5 and the responder is likely to 
regret renouncing to take 0.49 just because of the small deviation. In other words, she will 
approximate 0.49 by 0.5. Now, the same reasoning can be applied to x = 0.52, x = 0.53 etc. 
The reasoning applies as long as x can still be considered as an approximation of 0.5. In 
contrast, x = 0.65, for example, could not be considered that way anymore, because it is much 
nearer to x3 = 2/3. The equilibrium solution will be that number that is in between 0.5 and 2/3 
and is hardest to approximate by these values. This leads to the GR. That number is even 
hardest to approximate by any rational numbers in the sense that it is furthest away from any 
ratio of two small integers. On the basis of that definition of “irrationality”, it can in fact be 
proved that the GR is the most irrational of all numbers (cf. Havil, 2012).  
That this infinite fraction really gives the GR can be seen as follows. As any infinite part of 
the fraction is the same as the entire fraction, we can write 
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This implies 01**2 =−+xx , which gives the solution (1). Strictly speaking, it should be 
proved, in addition, that the continued fraction really converges. This can easily be seen by 
realizing that the values x1, x2, and x3 given above in the form of fractions are steps towards 
the infinite fraction. Moreover, they are quotients of Fibonacci numbers. In fact, all the finite 
fractions involved in the infinite fraction (6) are quotients of Fibonacci numbers (cf. Olds et 
al., 1992; Cuyt et al., 2008; Havil, 2012). For example, 
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The above-mentioned criterion of being hard to approximate by rational numbers exactly 
corresponds to the infinite continued fraction (7). It is related to the observation that the 
infinite fraction converges slowly because it only contains the lowest positive integer, unity, 
so that the partial denominators are small (cf. Cuyt et al., 2008). 
 
The 60:40 approximate solution 
As the proposer has to express her offer in usual numbers rather than by mentioning the GR or 
the square root of 5, she will usually round the offer. Due to our decimal numeral system, a 
straightforward way of rounding the GR is 60 %, thus offering 40 % to the responder. As 
60 % = 3/5, this is again equivalent to a ratio of Fibonacci numbers, as can be seen in Eq. (9). 
This coincidental equality of the rounded value with a ratio of Fibonacci numbers makes this  
approximate solution very appealing. It is in agreement with a frequently observed offer (cf. 
Henrich et al., 2005; Suleiman, 2014). 
It is worth noting that there are other number series that lead to the GR as well. For example, 
the Lucas numbers 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, … (cf. Koshy, 2001) are defined by the recursion formula 
(2) as well, but start with 
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The ratio of two consecutive Lucas numbers tends to the GR as well (cf. Koshy, 2001). For 
example, 7/11 = 0.6363… Let us check whether such ratios could provide a convenient 
approximate solution to the Ultimatum Game. x = 1/3 would certainly be too small, x = 3/4 
would probably be too high to provide a general solution, although an offer of 25 % is 
sometimes made. 4/7 = 0.571… and 7/11 = 0.636… are candidate solutions but are much less 
convenient than 3/5 because the latter matches our decimal numeral system much better.  
 
Discussion 
Here we have given an explanation to the hypothesis that the Golden Section (GR) could be 
the solution of the Ultimatum Game. It is appealing due to its good agreement of the 
theoretical result with experimental observations and the logical flow of reasoning. It is 
alternative and complementary to the explanation given by Suleiman (2014). That the GR is 
an irrational number should not be problem. When, for example, a painting or photograph 
involving the GR is aesthetically appealing, this is realized by people by intuition rather than 
iteration. This shows that the human brain is capable of estimating such numbers excellently 
without using a calculator.  
Comparing the value of the lower fraction of the GR, 0.382, with the empirical values from 
the literature (cf. Introduction) shows a remarkable agreement. Inspecting the observations 
reported by Henrich et al. (2005) in more detail shows that the mean value of offers observed 
with the ethnical group of Gnau in Papa New Guinea is closest to that value, because it was 
0.38. Also very close are the average offers observed with the Tzimane (0.37), Kazakh (0.36) 
and Hadza (0.40). An observation reported by many authors is that offers below 0.3 are 
generally rejected (cf. Nowak et al., 2000). This can be explained better by the GR solution 
than by a 2/3 vs. 1/3 solution or an equipartition. In numerical computer simulations by 
Nowak et al. (2000), the threshold of the offer below which all responders reject converged to 
about 0.4. In contrast, the average offer converged to about 0.5. Empirical observations show 
a rather wide distribution of offers, with a considerable fraction of people indeed making the 
equipartition offer of 0.5. 
The solution outlined above can be understood as follows. As the Golden Ratio is that number 
that is hardest to approximate by fractions of small integers, such an offer is hardest to 
evaluate by the responder in view of whether it is still near equipartition. Loosely speaking, 
she will not easily realize that she is disadvantaged. 
The above explanation is not a mathematical proof in the strict sense. It is based on several 
assumptions. Two very crucial assumptions are that an offer of 0.5 would always be accepted 
while an offer of 1/3 would usually not. While the former assumption is very plausible and is 
used by many authors in the field, it requires scrutiny. In an iterative version of the Ultimatum 
Game, the responder would have considerable power. She could push up offers by rejecting 
first. It is likely that, in the iterative version, many equilibrium solutions exist. If, say 1−x = 
57 % have been offered repeatedly (that is x < 0.5!), the proposer can hardly lower offers in 
later rounds because the responder might reject until 57 % are offered again. Interestingly, in 
the study by Henrich et al. (2005), one ethnical group (the Lamalera in Indonesia) were found 
to make average offers larger than 0.5, notably 0.57. My experience is that some children also 
make offers slightly higher than 0.5 in order to make absolutely sure that it will be accepted, 
although children appear to be more modest than adults when being on the responder side 
(Proctor et al., 2013).  
However, in this paper, we deal with the one-shot version of the game. Given that the people 
might assume that it is repeated, the solution will be influenced by learned rules of behaviour 
that exclude a behaviour pushing up offers unduly. Therefore, the proposer would not usually 
assume the responder to be that hard-boiled. 
As the proposer needs to express her offer in integer or perhaps rational numbers rather than 
by an intuitively felt ratio, it is unlikely that she would propose 38,2... %. Rather, she would 
round to 40 % or 1/3. These options for 1−x correspond, in fact, to two Fibonacci 
approximations for the GR, notably 3/5 and 2/3. And so does the equipartition solution ½. 
This is reminiscent of the various approximations of the GR realized in phyllotaxis (Jean, 
1994). Alternate leaves correspond to a ratio of ½, but other ratios of Fibonacci numbers can 
be observed on plants as well.  
The question arises whether the GR solution is found in the mind of the proposer immediately 
by intuition or by iteration in correspondence to Fibonacci numbers. This is hard to answer 
and deserves further study. As mentioned above, the aesthetic appeal of the GR is realized by 
people by intuition rather than iteration. In the Ultimatum Game, though, we assume that 
some iteration is occurring because the cases (i) and (ii) mentioned above Eq. (5) are likely to 
be thought about by the proposer. In the case of iteration, it is unlikely that the proposer 
would think about the convergence and, thereafter, would go back a step and approximate the 
irrational number by a rational number, say 3/5. Rather, she would stop the iteration at 3/5. 
The Ultimatum Game might even be relevant in microbiology. Several micro-organisms show 
the so-called sequential cross-feeding (Rozen and Lenski, 2000; Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer, 
2004). That is, a product excreted by one of them is taken up as a nutrient by the other. For 
example, some strain of the bacterium, Escherichia coli takes up glucose and converts it into 
acetate. This is taken up by another strain of the same species, which converts it further into 
CO2 and water. During evolution, the two strains or species must come to an agreement about 
the metabolic intermediate to be excreted and taken up. It might have been ethanol (as is the 
case for other pairs of species) rather than acetate. If the responder rejects the offered 
intermediate, the proposer will not survive either or at least be harmed because substances 
such as acetate and ethanol are toxic in higher concentrations. As these intermediates are 
much poorer substrates than glucose, the observed offer is less valuable than 50 %.  
Page and Nowak (2002) stress the importance of empathy in explaining the observations with 
humans. However, it need be clarified what is meant by empathy. It may mean anticipation of 
the strategy of the responder by thinking how would one decide when in her position. This is 
a usual assumption in analysing sequential games, although predicting the counterpart’s 
moves is often quite difficult, especially in games with many consecutive steps like chess. 
Anticipation usually stops after thinking about two or three consecutive steps, which might 
explain an approximate solution (see above). If empathy means compassion (which would 
prevent unfair offers), it is not always justified because usually players are assumed to 
maximize their payoff. For example, compassion would prevent the defect strategy in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, while exactly that strategy is often observed.   
As most people assume that the game will be iterated, there is actually more than one reason 
why the proposer should not offer too little. First, she must be afraid of rejection and second, 
she might assume that in a future round of the game, she will be a responder and the proposer 
who was a responder before might retaliate.  
The Golden Ratio is an irrational number. However, this need not imply that making an offer 
corresponding to it would be an irrational decision. The word irrational obviously has two 
different meanings. Interestingly, the mathematical meaning in defining a type of numbers has 
a pejorative connotation that may be questioned. Some “irrational” numbers may be 
understood in an easy and natural way. For example, the length of the diagonal of a right, 
equilateral triangle is intuitively comprehensible, although 2  is an “irrational” number. The 
same holds for the Golden Ratio.   
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